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COMMENTS
COMPANY DISCLOSURE OF EARNINGS
PROJECTIONS: SHOULD INDIVIDUAL
INVESTORS BE ALLOWED INTO THE "BALL
PARK"?
I. INTRODUCTION
Company disclosure of earnings projections has caused
much controversy over the years. After the passage of the
Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act), it was immediately debated whether
projections of future earnings should be allowed in securities
filings.' The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) eventu-
ally decided that they should not. It maintained this policy
for over thirty years2 and then in a surprise move in 1973 it
reversed course.3 The great clamor for company projections
by institutional and individual investors finally forced the
SEC to recognize that a company's release of earnings projec-
tions was a material event.4 As a result, the company prac-
tice of disclosing earnings estimates only to investment pro-
fessionals on an informal basis was against the full disclosure
mandate of the securities laws.5 To remedy this problem of
1. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
2. See SEC DISCLOSURE GROUP, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A
REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34
ACTS 96 (1969) [hereinafter WHEAT REPORT]. See also Disclosure of Projections
of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5362, [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,211, at 82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973)
[hereinafter SEC Release 5362].
3. See SEC Release 5362, supra note 2, at 82,667. Only four years before,
the Wheat Commission, set up to comprehensively analyze corporate disclosure
under the securities laws, endorsed the SEC policy of prohibiting projections
from security filings. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 2, at 76.
4. See SEC Release 5362, supra note 2, at 82,667.
5. See id. at 82,665-66.
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"selective disclosure" and to provide investors with informa-
tion they deemed important,6 the SEC decided to allow com-
panies to release their estimates in any medium, provided
that the information was disseminated "on an equitable basis
to all investors."7
After the publication of an influential congressional re-
port, which amplified the importance of projections to inves-
tors,8 the SEC refined its policy toward earnings estimates.9
Previously, it did not encourage or discourage the disclosure
of projections to the public." In 1978, however, it released a
statement advocating that companies release such informa-
tion." In an effort to stimulate more issuers to publish their
projections, the SEC passed a safe harbor rule in 1979, giving
companies protection from liability for certain projections. 2
Ultimately, the 1979 safe harbor turned out to be a failure as
even the SEC later admitted." It did not increase the
amount of company disclosures and, often times, companies
that did make disclosures could not invoke its protection due
to the harbor's narrowness. 4
Court decisions significantly impacted company disclo-
sure policies during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1977
one court affirmed that "selective disclosure," 5 the company
6. See id. at 82,667.
7. Id.
8. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH
CONG., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, at 55 (Comm. Print 95-29, 1977)
[hereinafter 1977 REPORT].
9. See Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Perform-
ance, Securities Act Release No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 81,756, at 81,037 (Nov. 7, 1978) [hereinafter SEC Release 5992].
10. See Adoption of Amendment to Rule 14a-9 and Withdrawal of Other
Proposals, Securities Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 80,461, at 86,201 (Apr. 23, 1976) [hereinafter SEC Release
5699].
11. SEC Release 5992, supra note 9, at 81,037.
12. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T1 82,117, at 81,938 (July 2, 1979)
(adopting Exchange Act rule 3b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1997), and Securities
Act rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1997)) [hereinafter SEC Release 6084].
13. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Toward a Real Safe Harbor for Forward Look-
ing Statements: A Reassessment of Rule 175, 866 PLI/CORP. 671, 673 (1994)
[hereinafter Pitt et al., Toward a Real Safe Harbor].
14. See Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 33-7101, 57 Docket (CCH) 1999, 2007-08 (Oct. 13, 1994) [hereinafter
SEC Release 33-7101].
15. Selective disclosure also has a broader meaning; the disclosure of any
820 [Vol. 39
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practice of disseminating its earnings projections to only se-
curity analysts, was unlawful. 6 However, it held that "dif-
ferential disclosure," 7 the company practice of responding to
analyst queries regarding the analyst's own projections, did
not violate the securities laws."R Thus, a company could not
proactively call a securities analyst to disclose its earnings
projections. 9 But it could comment on whether an analyst's
estimate of the company earnings prospects was in the "ball
park," provided that the company was "not trying to give
their stock a little jiggle," and did not "go overboard."" Fi-
nally, with Dirks v. SEC2 in 1983, the Supreme Court
weighed in on the controversial issue of analyst disclosure. It
carved out a seemingly wide safe harbor for analyst commu-
nications, holding that disclosure of material non-public in-
formation to analysts is appropriate as long as the insiders
providing such information are not motivated by "pecuniary
gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future
earnings."2
Congress recently revisited the issue of corporate disclo-
sure with the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 (PSLRA).2" Congress implemented the law
primarily to curtail abusive securities litigation arising over
forward-looking statements24 by adopting a stronger pleading
standard" and a new safe harbor. 26 A secondary goal of the
legislation was the increased dissemination of company
material information to only select individuals. See infra note 144 and accom-
panying text.
16. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1238 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
17. Differential disclosure refers not only to earnings guidance given only to
analysts, but also to any other information reserved exclusively for the profes-
sional investment community. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
18. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
19. See id. at 1238.
20. Id. at 1231.
21. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
22. Id. at 663.
23. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (1995).
24. See Statement of Managers-The "Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995," H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, 104th Cong. 1st. Sess. at 31 [here-
inafter Statement of Managers].
25. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-4 (West 1997).
26. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-5 (West 1997).
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earning estimates.27 It was thought with the threat of frivo-
lous litigation effectively eliminated companies would natu-
rally choose a more open disclosure model and provide earn-
ing projections directly to the public.28
So far only a small minority of companies disclose
"earnings guidance" to the public.2 9 The majority instead opt
to disclose such information to only some in the professional
investment community." Some commentators believe that
companies will never implement the more open disclosure
model that Congress envisioned.31 They take the view that
companies are reluctant to put earnings guidance in print not
because of liability fears, but because of potential image
problems if their projections prove grossly inaccurate.32 Oth-
ers, however, believe that most companies will eventually
disclose in press releases the type of guidance they currently
reserve only for analysts.33 These commentators think that
once the ambiguities of the PSLRA are resolved by the courts
and companies become confident that good faith earnings
projections will not expose them to a flood of litigation, dis-
closure policies will change. 4 However, under this best case
scenario, most companies will not disclose projections more
widely for at least a few more years. In light of the fact that
the current disclosure system gives some analysts and their
clients a trading advantage in the market at the expense of
individual investors, should the SEC let it continue, even if
only for a short time? If not, what is the SEC's best course of
action to remedy the situation?
This comment first examines the goals of the 1933 Act
27. See Statement of Managers, supra note 24, at 45.
28. See Gerald S. Backmun et al., Forward Looking Statements and Cau-
tionary Language After the 1995 Reform Act: An Empirical Study, 1020
PLI/CORP. 153, 157 (1997).
29. See infra notes 209-210 and accompanying text. The most prominent of
these companies are Intel and PeopleSoft. See Adam Lashinsky, Looking For-
ward to More Companies Lifting the Veil, SAN JOSE MERCURY, Nov. 3, 1997, at
El.
30. See infra notes 209-210 and accompanying text.
31. See Tom Pratt, Litigation Reform Seen Having Minimal Impact on In-formation Sharing: 'Forward looking statement' may still be hazardous,
INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Jan. 15, 1996, at 6.
32. See id.
33. Telephone Interview with Ronald E.F. Codd, Chief Executive Officer of
Momentum Business Applications Inc. and Former Chief Financial Officer of
PeopleSoft Inc. (October 28, 1998).
34. See id.
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and the 1934 Act, the basis of our securities laws. 35  The
comment then outlines the SEC's and the courts' changing
views on earnings projections as well as Congress's recent
legislation in the area." Next, the comment addresses the
conflict between the policies underlying the securities laws
and the differential disclosure realities of investor relations
today.37 The comment then analyzes the arguments sup-
porting differential disclosure." Finally, the comment con-
cludes that due to current market dynamics, the SEC should
pass a rule declaring the disclosure of earnings guidance a
material event. With such a rule in place, companies who
wish to give guidance to the market would have to dissemi-
nate their projections to the general public, not just a few
select analysts. 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Foundation of Securities Law: The 1933 Act and the
1934 Act
Federal regulation of securities began with the 1933 Act4"
and the 1934 Act.4' The goal of both Acts can best be under-
stood as the promotion of a more efficient 42 securities mar-
ket.4' To achieve this goal, the legislation mandates company
35. See discussion infra Part II.A.
36. See discussion infra Part II.B-D.
37. See discussion infra Part III.
38. See discussion infra Part IV.
39. See discussion infra Part VI.
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1997).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1997).
42. Market efficiency has two components: informational efficiency and al-
locational efficiency. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION, 36-38
(Aspen 2d. ed. 1997). "On close inspection, there are really two distinct aspects
of market efficiency: informational efficiency and allocational efficiency. Infor-
mational efficiency describes the speed with which market prices adjust to new
information. Allocational efficiency concerns the allocation of resources to their
best or highest use." Id. at 38. "Prices in an efficient market more closely re-
flect underlying value than in an inefficient market, and scarce resources are
therefore allocated more efficiently." Id. at 36. By mandating company disclo-
sures, Congress with the 1933 and 1934 Acts sought to increase informational
efficiency and thus increase allocational efficiency. See 1977 REPORT, supra
note 8, at 562. "The [1933] Act was founded on the theory that informed inves-
tors seeking to maximize their own investment needs and objectives resulted in
the most efficient allocation of capital among innumerable alternative invest-
ment opportunities." Id. at 563.
43. See 1977 REPORT, supra note 8, at 560. " The system of corporate dis-
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disclosure of materia144 information and establishes liability
for false and misleading statements 5
The impetus behind both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act
was the stock market crash of 1929.46 President Roosevelt
blamed the market failure on the unethical and dishonest
practices of many in the securities industry.47 He called on
Congress to adopt legislation mandating public companies to
disclose information in order to restore "honest dealing in se-
curities and thereby bring back public confidence. 48 It was
thought that without a mandatory disclosure system: 1) some
issuers would conceal or misrepresent information material
to investment decisions; 2) underwriting and insiders' sala-
ries would be too high; 3) public confidence in the markets
would decrease; 4) state laws and private associations like
the New York Stock Exchange would not generate the appro-
priate amount of corporate disclosure; and 5) criminal and
civil actions would also not ensure the appropriate amount of
corporate disclosure. 9
Those advocating disclosure as a solution to the market's
ailments were no doubt influenced by the writings of Louis
Brandeis. ° Mr. Brandeis noted that the prospect of disclo-
sure of certain information could deter unethical behavior
and vigorously argued for adequate public disclosure of mate-
closure that emerged under the [1933] Act and the [1934] Act can best be un-
derstood as one aspect of an essentially two pronged approach that was de-
signed to promote more efficient securities markets." Id.
44. The Supreme Court, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32
(1988), held that information is "material" if there is "a substantial likelihood
[that its disclosure would be viewed] by a reasonable investor as having signifi-
cantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." Id. (quoting TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). It elaborated that
"materiality 'will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indi-
cated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the
event in light of the totality of the company activity.'" Id. at 238 (quoting SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
45. See 1977 REPORT, supra note 8, at 564-65.
46. See id. at 560-61.
47. See H. R. REP. No. 85, at 1-2 (1933) (President Roosevelt's address to
Congress). "I recommend to the Congress legislation for Federal supervision of
traffic in investment securities in interstate commerce. In spite of many State
statutes the public in the past has sustained severe losses through practices
neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons and corporations selling
securities." Id.
48. Id.
49. See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Dis-
closure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1983).
50. See 1977 REPORT, supra note 8, at 557.
824 [Vol. 39
EARNINGS PROJECTIONS
rial facts "as a remedy for social and industrial diseases."'"
Mr. Brandeis memorably pointed out that "[s]unlight is said
to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policemen."52
B. The SEC and Corporate Disclosure of Earnings
Projections
1. The Early Years
The 1933 Act and the 1934 Act mandate companies to
disclose material facts-those matters as to which an average
prudent investor ought reasonably be informed. 3 Because it
was widely recognized, as early as the turn of the century,
that the value of a security depends on estimates of future
earnings in most cases,14 the SEC immediately faced the
question of whether or not companies should be allowed to
disclose their projections in securities filings." The SEC ini-
tially determined that companies should be able to disclose
estimates, but then quickly reversed itself.7  It reasoned
that projections should not be disclosed in SEC filings be-
cause they were mere conjecture," which investors might rely
on unreasonably, 9 and management might manipulate to
their own advantage.6' According to the SEC, the investor
51. Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How BANKERS USE IT,
93 (1914).
52. Id.
53. See Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities
Regulation, 16 BUS. LAW. 300, 307 (1961). See also note 44.
54. See Heller, supra note 53, at 304.
55. See In re Thomas Bond, Inc. 5 S.E.C. 60 (1939); In re Ypres Cadillac
Mines, Ltd., 3 S.E.C. 41, (1938); In re American Kid Co., 1 S.E.C. 694 (1936).
56. See In re Ypres Cadillac Mines, Ltd., 3 S.E.C. 41, (1938); In re American
Kid Co., 1 S.E.C. 694 (1936).
57. See In re Thomas Bond, Inc. 5 S.E.C. 60 (1939). In Thomas Bond, a
company included in its prospectus estimates of future earnings after its pres-
entation of past earnings. The court stated that the estimates "lend an appear-
ance of predictability of future profits which is improper for a corporation which
has yet to start business. Although stated as an estimate of future profits, the
use of definite figures is misleading." Id. at 71.
58. See Heller, supra note 53, at 307; Roger J. Dennis, Mandatory Disclo-
sure Theory and Management Projections: A Law and Economics Perspective, 46
MD. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (1987).
59. See Heller, supra note 53, at 307; Dennis, supra note 58, at 1198.
60. See Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some
Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1197 n.189 (1970) (quoting Philip Loomis, the
SEC's General Counsel at the time). "[O]ver the years, we have encountered an
1999] 825
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was just as capable as the corporate insider of projecting
earnings based on previously disclosed objectively verifiable
facts.61 One former SEC official outlined the SEC's general
stance: "like the hero of 'Dragnet,' [the SEC] is interested ex-
clusively in the facts. Conjectures and speculations as to the
future are left by the Act to the investor on the theory that he
is as competent as anyone to predict the future from the
given facts. 62
By prohibiting companies from disclosing earnings pro-
jections in their filings, the SEC did not completely deny the
individual investor access to earnings guidance from experts.
The SEC allowed companies to disseminate earnings projec-
tions to the individual investors via other means such as
press releases. 3 In the case of disclosure by press release,
the SEC felt that because the information did not pass
through the SEC-implicitly receiving its mark of approval-
the investor would not put too much confidence in it. 64 Fur-
thermore, the SEC believed that investment professionals
would come up with their own estimates of future earnings
and through the "filtration process" such information would
unscrupulous fringe among promoters whose predictions are pretty far out. We
do not want them going [public] under [the SEC's] auspices." Id. Liability for
projections was also an underlying concern. Because the common law classified
bona fide projections as opinions not facts, actions in fraud and deceit could not
be maintained. Thus, management could derive any benefits of the estimates
without exposing itself to any liability. See Heller, supra note 53, at n.18. An-
other concern was "the difficulty of SEC and judicial review of information not
objectively verifiable." Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts' Approach to
Disclosure Obligations of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other
Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114, 1119
(1987).
61. See Heller, supra note 53, at 307. See also WHEAT REPORT, supra note
2, at 96.
It has been the [SEC]'s long standing policy not to permit projections
and predictions in prospectuses and reports filed with the [SEC]. Such
documents are designed to elicit material facts. Their factual charac-
ter is widely recognized. Investors and their advisors are at liberty to
make their own projections based on the disclosures resulting from the
[SEC]'s requirements.
Id.
62. Heller, supra note 53, at 307.
63. See Hiler, supra note 60, at 1120; Dennis, supra note 58, at 1198.
64. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 2, at 96. "A real danger exists, in the
Study's judgment, that projections appearing in prospectuses and other docu-
ments filed under the securities laws and reviewed by the [SEC] would be ac-
corded a greater measure of validity by the unsophisticated investor than they
would deserve." Id.
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reach the individual investor.65
2. The SEC's Policy Statement of 1973
The SEC did not change its long standing policy of pro-
hibiting earnings projections in security filings until 1973.66
At this time, the SEC finally recognized what the trading
public long knew: management's assessment of company
prospects was material information.67 Plain and simple,
when insiders spoke markets moved.68  Unfortunately, com-
panies prohibited from releasing projections in security fil-
ings most often released such information through informal
discussions leading to uneven market dissemination.69 To
"bring order and fairness to the forecasting procedure and
benefit both the public corporations and the investing pub-
lic,"7" the SEC proposed a voluntary full disclosure system.'
1
Companies did not have to release earnings estimates, but if
they choose to do so they would have to make such informa-
tion available "on an equitable basis to all investors."72 That
is, they would have to report forecast information the same
way as other material events such as earnings results, merg-
ers, or acquisitions. 3
The SEC's voluntary full disclosure proposal was very in-
65. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 2, at 52.
Indeed it was recognized from the beginning that a fully effective dis-
closure policy would require the reporting of complicated business facts
that would have little meaning for the average investor. Such disclo-
sures reach average investors through a process of filtration in which
intermediaries (brokers, bankers, investment advisors, publishers of
investment advisory literature, and occasionally lawyers) play a vital
role.
Id.
66. See SEC Release 5362, supra note 2, at 82,666. "It has been the [SEC]'s
long standing policy generally not to permit projections to be included in pro-
spectuses and reports filed with the [SEC]." Id.
67. See id. at 82,665-66.
68. See id. at 82,666. "But, whatever the problems of regulating the pre-
vailing existence of earnings forecasts from corporate management, their un-
even circulation to outsiders, and their considerable effect on market values
demand an active persistent and prudent program ...." Id.
69. See SEC Release 5362, supra note 2, at 82,665. "For too long, discus-
sions by corporations with outsiders on future economic performance have gone
on behind a cloak of informal practice and procedure and this has led to uneven
and unfair dissemination of forcast information." Id.
70. Id. at 82,666.
71. See id. at 82,665.
72. Id. at 82,667.
73. See id. at 82,665-66.
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tricate. Under the proposal, the SEC differentiated between
"reporting" and "issuing" companies.74 Reporting companies,
defined as companies reporting under the 1934 Act for a rea-
sonable amount of time with a history of earnings and inter-
nal budgeting, could publish projections in their securities
filings.75 These companies would have to detail the underly-
ing assumptions behind their projections and update such
projections "on a regular basis, as well as in the event of ma-
terial changes."7" Issuing companies, those not meeting the
requirements of reporting companies or those choosing not to
be classified as "reporting companies," could publish their
projections in any medium provided they filed their projec-
tions with the SEC on a special form.77 Both reporting and
issuing companies would be required to include in their an-
nual reports the forecasts made during the year, the circum-
stances under which the forecasts were made, the variances
between the forecasts and the actual results, and an explana-
tion of the variances." Both types of companies would also be
shielded from liability for erroneous estimates if such esti-
mates were "reasonably based in fact, prepared with reason-
able care and carefully reviewed."79
3. The SEC's Policy Statement of 1976
The elaborate voluntary disclosure system advocated in
the SEC's 1973 policy statement was ultimately rejected in
1976 after unfavorable public comment."0 Although the ma-
jority of commentators believed that company projections
were of great value to investors, virtually all opposed the
proposed system for fear that it would inhibit rather than en-
courage the dissemination of estimates.8
Even though the SEC declined to adopt the system it ad-
vocated in 1973, its policy towards earnings projections re-
mained essentially the same. The SEC continued to permit
74. See Marshall M. Taylor, The SEC Policy for Projections: New Problems
in Disclosure, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 242, 247 (1973).
75. See SEC Release 5362, supra note 2, at 82,667.
76. Id.
77. See Taylor, supra note 74, at 249.
78. See id. at 248-49.
79. SEC Release 5362, supra note 2, at 82,668.
80. See SEC Release 5699, supra note 10, at 86,201.
81. See SEC Release 5992, supra note 9, at 81,036.
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the inclusion of earnings estimates in filings.82 It remained
concerned about equitable disclosure of company earnings es-
timates and reminded "issuers of their responsibilities under
the federal securities laws in connection with the dissemina-
tion of [material] information."83 The SEC also maintained
that companies should be shielded from liability for inaccu-
rate projections only if their estimates were "reasonably
based and adequately presented."84
The SEC, however, retreated from its policy decision on
the materiality of earnings projections. In 1973, the SEC
held that "the issuance of a forecast ... to any out-
sider... [is] a material event."85 It now only held that "man-
agement's assessment of a company's future performance
frequently may be material to investors."86 The SEC further
pointed out that it was "neither encouraging nor discouraging
the making and filing of projections because of the diversity
of views on the importance and reliability of projections."87
4. The 1977 Report of the Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure
A few months before the SEC's 1976 release, Congress
formed The Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure
(Committee) to comprehensively study the disclosure system
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, assess its validity, and pro-
vide recommendations for its improvement.88 The formation
of the Committee was spurred by scholarly debate, which
doubted the worth of the mandatory system of corporate dis-
closure implemented by the 1933 and 1934 Act. The Com-
82. See SEC Release 5699, supra note 10, at 86,201. "Since investors ap-
pear to want management's assessment of a company's future performance,
however, and since some managements may wish to furnish their projections
through SEC filings, the [SEC] is of the general view that it will not object to
such disclosure." Id.
83. Id. at 86,202.
84. Id.
85. SEC Release 5362, supra note 2, at 82,665-66 (emphasis added).
86. SEC Release 5699, supra note 10, at 86,202 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 86,201.
88. See 1977 REPORT, supra note 8, at D-2-D-3. The Committee was made
up of the following individuals: A.A. Sommer, Jr., William H. Beaver, Warren
E. Buffett, John C. Burton, Victor H. Brown, Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Ray J.
Groves, Deborah E. Kelly, Homer Kripke, Alan B. Levenson, Martin Lipton,
Robert E. Malin, Roger Murray, David Norr, Elliot J. Weiss, Frank T. Weston.
89. See id. at I.
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mittee's report, issued in November of 1977, would later be-
come the basis of further SEC policy action with regard to the
dissemination of company earnings projections.9"
In formulating its report, the Committee polled a number
of market participants including companies, analysts, portfo-
lio managers, and individual investors.91 Among the survey
findings were the following:
Management's principle criticism of the SEC's disclosure
system was that the [SEC]'s requirements mandated the
filing of unnecessary or meaningless information. 92
[A significant] number of analysts (18 out of 47) [had] ac-
cess to company projections.93
[Mianagement's own earnings projections of the company's
performance were considered by analysts as being vital in-
formation in the first instance rather than simply confir-
matory of the analysts' projection.94
Almost half of the investors favored disclosure of an
earnings projection in the company's annual report, al-
though a large proportion of investors indicated that the
necessary uncertainty [of predictions] makes such projec-
tions of dubious utility.95
[I]ndividual investors and analysts are likely to utilize a
fundamental approach in evaluating securities and to at-
tempt to check and cross-check hypotheses and conclu-
sions through other techniques.96
On the basis of its study the Committee concluded that
the mandatory disclosure system's benefits outweighed its
costs and thus should be retained.97 Underlying the Commit-
tee's conclusion were the ideas that sufficient reliable and
timely information is essential to the efficient allocation of
resources in the economy and that market forces and self in-
terest cannot be relied on to assure such information.99 The
Committee articulated that the SEC's role in the corporate
90. See discussion infra Part II.B.5.
91. See 1977 REPORT, supra note 8, at I.
92. Id. at 29.
93. Id. at 80.
94. Id. at 55.
95. Id. at 273.
96. Id. at 300.
97. See 1977 REPORT, supra note 8, at XXXVIII.
98. See id. at II.
830 [Vol. 39
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disclosure system is "to assure the public availability[,] in an
efficient and reasonable manner[,] on a timely basis[,] of reli-
able, firm orientated information material to informed in-
vestment and corporate suffrage decision making."99
On the topic of earnings projections, the Committee en-
dorsed the SEC's departure from its old standing policy of
prohibiting estimates in security filings.' ° There was some
debate over whether the SEC should go further and actually
require companies to release their earnings estimates. The
Committee, in the end, opted for voluntary disclosure instead
of mandatory disclosure because it felt that: 1) the SEC did
not have an appropriate basis to formulate rules governing
such a system; 2) companies might reasonably find that the
costs of providing projections would outweigh the benefits; 3)
companies should not be forced to expose themselves to risks
of litigation and liability for inaccurate projections; 4) many
companies would find it difficult, if not impossible, to prepare
reasonable estimates; and 5) market demand may be strong
enough to compel such disclosure without intervention.!1 In
addition to recommending a voluntary disclosure system for
corporate earnings estimates, the Committee outlined the
principal features such a system should have. ' 2
5. The SEC's 1978 Policy Statement
Just a year after the 1977 report, the SEC revisited the
topic of company earnings projections and adopted many of
the Committee's recommendations.' 1 The SEC, following the
Committee's suggestion, issued a statement permitting and
encouraging all companies, without exception,14 to publish
projections in security filings and other mediums.' It also
agreed with the Committee on the need for a safe harbor that
would cover projections reasonably based and made in good
99. Id. at 305.
100. See id. at 349.
101. See id. at 354-55.
102. See id. at 356-65.
103. See SEC Release 5992, supra note 9, at 81,034. The SEC also issued a
preliminary statement in response to the 1977 Report several months earlier.
See Preliminary Response of the Commission, Securities Act Release No. 5906,
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,505, at 80,046 (Feb. 15,
1978).
104. See SEC Release 5992, supra note 9, at 81,037.
105. See id. at 81,034.
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faith. 1 6
The safe harbor proposed by the SEC, however, was dif-
ferent from the Committee's proposal in significant re-
spects."7 The SEC's safe harbor only protected reporting
companies that were current with their filings."0 ' The Com-
mittee's covered all companies regardless of the status of
their filings.0 9 The SEC's proposal put the burden of proof on
the defendant to establish that the projection was reasonably
based and prepared in good faith, while the Committee's ver-
sion required the plaintiff to show that the projection was
made without a reasonable basis and without good faith."0
Furthermore, the SEC rejected the Committee's recommen-
dation to allow companies the freedom of filing the assump-
tions behind their projections and resuming or discontinuing
projections."' It held that where underlying assumptions
may be material to an understanding of the projection, dis-
closure may be necessary."' For example, it maintained that
where a projection is "based to a significant degree upon the
introduction of a new product or service meeting certain an-
ticipated levels of sales and contribution to earnings, disclo-
sure of the projection without this information might be mis-
leading.""3
6. The SEC's 1979 Safe Harbor: 1934 Rule 3b-6, & 1933
Rule 175
In 1979, the SEC eventually passed a safe harbor rule for
projections made in good faith and with a reasonable basis."4
The adopted safe harbor contained elements derived from
public commentaries and the earlier proposals articulated by
the SEC and the Committee,"' according protection to both
reporting and non-reporting companies.16 It covered for-
ward-looking statements made in registration statements,
106. See id. at 81,037.
107. See SEC Release 6084, supra note 12, at 81,939-44.
108. See id. at 81,939.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 81,942.
112. See id.
113. SEC Release 5992, supra note 9, at 81,038.
114. See SEC Release 6084, supra note 12, at 81,938. The safe harbor provi-
sions were codified in 17 C.F.R. 175 (1997) and 17 C.F.R. 240.3b-6 (1997).
115. See id. at 81,939-44.
116. See id. at 81,942-43.
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1934 Act reports, annual reports to shareholders, and other
documents filed with the SEC."7 Disclosures made outside of
these documents also received protection if they were later
included in such documents."8  The SEC justified granting
safe harbor protection only for filed statements on the basis
that 1) investors could better analyze the projections in con-
junction with certified financial statements, 2) projections in
filings would be better prepared due to the prospect of staff
review, and 3) inclusion in filings would promote greater ac-
cessibility thereby minimizing concerns over selective disclo-
"19
sure.
On other controversial issues the SEC ultimately held
that: 1) the burden of proof would be placed on the plaintiff to
establish that the company formulated its projection in bad
faith or without a reasonable basis;"0 2) reporting companies
need only file their most recent 10-K report for coverage; 2'
and 3) safe harbor protection would not be accorded where
the company did not disclose assumptions material to an un-
derstanding of the projection 121 or where the company
breached its duty to update.' The SEC articulated that
companies had a duty to update
statements made in any filing.., if the statements have
either become inaccurate by virtue of subsequent events,
or are later discovered to have been false and misleading
from the outset, and the issuer knows or should know that
persons are continuing to rely on all or any material por-
tion of the statements.'24
The 1979 safe harbor formulated by the SEC was ulti-
mately a failure as even the SEC would later acknowledge.'
Despite according explicit protection for certain forward-
looking statements, it did not increase the amount of com-
117. See id. at 81,943.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. SEC Release 6084, supra note 12, at 81,939. The SEC noted that ac-
cording to some commentators the SEC' s proposal that the defendant be ac-
corded the burden of proof was narrower than existing law and would afford
less protection than no rule at all. See id. at 81,940.
121. See id. at 81,944.
122. See id. at 81,942.
123. See id. at 81,943.
124. Id. at 81,943.
125. See Pitt et al., Toward a Real Safe Harbor, supra note 13, at 673.
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pany disclosures.'26 Many companies still did not report pro-
jections for fear, whether real or perceived, of shareholder
litigation if their estimates proved inaccurate."7 Those that
did report their forecasts found no refuge in what they felt
was an ill conceived safe harbor.'28 Companies complained
that the safe harbor was deficient because it was too narrow,
covering only those projections filed with the SEC. 2 9 Many
companies made forward-looking statements in response to
analyst questions. 3 ° Because of the great frequency of these
remarks, such companies felt it impossible to memorialize
every occasion. 13 Companies also bemoaned that the provi-
sions of the safe harbor were not applied in a manner that led
to quick and inexpensive dismissal of fraudulent suits.'32
Judges that were applying the safe harbor had to determine
whether the projections were made in good faith and with a
reasonable basis. 3  Deliberation on these sensitive factual
questions often precluded early pre-discovery dismissal.3 1
Companies further criticized the safe harbor for its failure to
explicitly state under what instances companies had a "duty
to update" their projections. 5
C. The Courts and Company Disclosure of Earnings
Estimates
The judiciary's approach toward company disclosure of
earnings projections has undergone extensive change over
the years.'36 From the 1930s to the early 1970s, courts, like
the SEC, believed that predictive information was inappro-
priate for SEC filings because it tended to mislead "by con-
veying a certitude which inherently [it could] not possess."'37
126. See SEC Release 33-7101, supra note 14, at 2007.
127. See id. at 2007.




132. See SEC Release 33-7101, supra note 14, at 2008.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 2008-09.
136. See id. at 2005-07; Hiler, supra note 60, 1124-31; Janet Kerr, A Walk
Through the Circuits: The Duty to Disclose Soft Information, 46 MD. L. REV.
1071, 1072 (1987).
137. Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 409 (N.D. Ill.
1964). In Union, the court found an analyst' s report containing earnings esti-
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During this period, courts also did not recognize that projec-
tions made by management outside of securities filings were
"facts" that could be held as false and misleading under the
securities laws. 38
In the 1970s, with the shift in SEC policy allowing the
inclusion of company earnings forecasts in SEC documents,
courts reconsidered their prior holdings on the topic of projec-
tions. In Marx v. Computer Science,'39 the court for the first
time held that an earnings projection had "fact" components
that could bring it under security law scrutiny."' The court
noted that predictive statements are not actionable as false
statements simply because they prove inaccurate.' It ex-
plained that underlying every projection there are two im-
plicit factual representations: 1) the statement was made in
good faith and 2) the statement was made with a reasonable
basis. 42 In the event that the plaintiff can show either lack-
ing, a valid claim arises."
One court in the mid 1970s recognized the propriety of
differential disclosure. Like the SEC, the judiciary believed
that selective disclosure"4 -- companies providing their earn-
ings projections to analysts without releasing the estimates
more widely-was against the securities law prohibition of
insider trading."' The Bausch & Lomb court'46 declared,
mates for the corporation to constitute proxy materials. Because the report
contained estimates it was deemed to be false and misleading. See id. at 410.
138. See SEC Release 33-7101, supra note 14, at 2006.
139. 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974).
140. See SEC Release 33-7101, supra note 14, at 2006.
141. See Marx, 507 F.2d at 489-90.
142. See id. at 490.
143. See id.
144. The term "selective disclosure" has a second meaning. It is also used to
describe the company release of any material information only to select indi-
viduals.
145. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F.Supp. 1226, 1238 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). The prohibition against insider trading is based on Section 10b of the
1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. Section 10b provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange ... [t]o use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. 78j (1997). Rule 10b-5, which was promulgated under Section 10b,
states:
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however, that a company could indicate whether an analyst's
estimate was in the "ball park"'47 provided it did not "go over-
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange.... [t]o employ any de-
vice, scheme, or artifice to defraud ... [t]o make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or ... [tlo engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or de-
ceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1997).
Interpreting Rule 10b-5, courts have established two theories of liability for
"insider trading." Under the classical theory, Rule 10b-5 is violated "when a
corporate insider trades on the basis of material nonpublic information."
United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997). The O'Hagan Court
explained that "[t]rading on such information qualifies as a 'deceptive device'
under § 10b... because 'a relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between
the shareholders of a corporation and [the] insiders.'" Id. (quoting Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)). This relationship mandates that the
insider disclose nonpublic material information before trading or abstain from
trading in order to "'prevent[ ] [the] insider from ... taking unfair advantage of
... uninformed ... stockholders.'" Id. (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 228 (1980)). The classical theory applies to "officers, directors and
other permanent insiders of a corporation but also to attorneys, accountants,
consultants and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corporation."
Id. Under the Misappropriation theory, Rule 10b-5 is violated when a pe rson
"misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes in
breach of a duty owed to the source." Id. Here, liability is based "on a fiduci-
ary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to confi-
dential information." Id.
In Bausch & Lomb, the SEC sought injunctive relief against an insider who
released his company's internal earnings estimate for the upcoming quarter to
an analyst. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1231-37
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). The court found that the executive's action constituted the
disclosure of material, non-public corporate information. Id. at 1238. However,
it denied the injunctive relief finding that there was no reasonable likelihood
that the insider would violate the securities laws in the future. Id. at 1244.
146. 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
147. The majority of companies continue to give "guidance" to analysts today.
See infra note 209. This practice may expose companies to liability. Some
courts have found that management's comments regarding their comfort level
with analyst earnings estimates are equivalent to direct earnings projections.
In In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig, 114 F.3d 1410, (3d Cir. 1997), the
court summed up its position as follows:
To say one is "comfortable" with an analyst's projection is to say that
one adopts and endorses it as reasonable. When a high-ranking corpo-
rate officer explicitly expresses agreement with an outside forecast,
that is close, if not the same, to the officer's making the forecast. We
see no reason why adopting an analyst's forecast by reference should
insulate an officer from liability where making the same forecast would
not.
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board"'48 and was "not trying to give their stock a little jig-
gle."'49 The concept of differential disclosure" ° was thus born.
Id. at 1429. Accordingly, comfort statements may be actionable under Rule
10b-5 just like any other company statement. See In re Burlington Coat Fac-
tory Sec. Litig. 114 F.3d 1410, 1428-29 (3d Cir. 1997); Moss v. Healthcare Com-
pare Corp., 75 F.3d 276, 280-81 (7th Cir. 1996); Acito v. Imcera Group Inc., 47
F.3d 47, 50-53 (2d. Cir. 1995); In re Adobe Systems Sec. Litig. 787 F. Supp. 912,
915-16 (N.D. Cal. 1992). But see Malone v. Microdyne Corp. 26 F.3d 471, 479-80
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that comfort statements, because they are not guaran-
tees of future performance, are not actionable as a matter of law); Raab v. Gen-
eral Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that company pro-
jections, which are not expressed as guarantees, are not actionable because no
reasonable investor would rely on such statements and a contrary policy would
deter companies from discussing future prospects); In re Newbridge Networks
Sec. Litig., 962 F. Supp. 166, 173-74 (D.D.C. 1997); Jakobe v. Rawlings Sporting
Goods Co., 964 F. Supp. 1143, 1160 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
In general, for a plaintiff to state a valid claim based on Section 10b and
Rule 10b-5 (for statutory text see supra note 145), he must show that the com-
pany made a (1) materially (2) false statement (or omitted to state a material
fact that was necessary to make a statement not misleading), (3) with an intent
to deceive (scienter), (4) which the plaintiff relied on, (5) causing the plaintiffs
damages. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1417 (3d
Cir. 1997). In the context of a claim based on an earnings projection, a plaintiff
must show that the projection was issued without a reasonable basis to estab-
lish prong (2), a false statement. See id. at 1427. This burden, along with the
scienter requirement, often proves the most troublesome for a plaintiff to meet.
See Ronald 0. Mueller and Gavin A. Beske, Cold Comfort: The Risks of Express-
ing 'Comfort' with Analysts' Estimates, INSIGHTS, July 1998, at 18, 21.
In dealings with analysts, companies must be careful about more than
just its projections and comfort statements. Corporations may also be subject
to 10b-5 liability stemming from their relations with analysts where they: (1)
provide an analyst with false information, see Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616,
623-24 (9th Cir. 1997), (2) entangle themselves with an analyst's report, see El-
kind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc. 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Syntax
Sec. Litig., 855 F. Supp. 1086, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 1994), or (3) disseminate an
analyst's report, see In re Cypress Semiconductor Securities Litig., 891 F. Supp.
1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
148. Presumably, the court, in stating that a company should not go "over-
board" with "ball park" estimates, was reminding corporations of the securities
laws prohibition on insider trading. Where a company's "ball park" guidance
would be materially different from the analyst community's or market's expec-
tation, providing such guidance to a select few may go "overboard" and consti-
tute the disclosure of inside information. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420
F. Supp. 1226, 1232 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). "Mr. Wright: Would it be proper for a
company officer to discuss the implications on earnings of a volume of business
somewhat larger than that forecast at the time of the annual meeting. Mr
Loomis: Yes, provided they don't go overboard." Id.
149. Id. at 1231. Presumably, the court, in noting that "ball park" guidance
would be inappropriate if made to "give the stock a jiggle," was reminding cor-
porations of their obligation under the securities laws to be truthful in the
marketplace. Under Rule 10b-5 companies are liable for comments designed to
artificially increase or decrease their stock price.
150. The term "differential disclosure" evolved from the idea that a profes-
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The court thought this policy was appropriate because the
analyst provided the market a needed service of "culling and
sifting available data," yielding helpful analysis.' The idea
that such disclosure was improper because investors did not
have the same access was dismissed, at least in part, because
of distribution realities. The court recounted comments
made by Philip Loomis, the one time General Counsel of the
SEC. Mr. Loomis took the position that company disclosure
to analysts is not improper for "the mere fact that [the infor-
mation] has not already been disseminated," because a con-
tradictory policy would require companies "to send their
stockholders something the size of a telephone book."'52
The Supreme Court eventually tackled the issue of dis-
closure to analysts in 1983. In Dirks v. SEC,153 an analyst,
with information provided by insiders, exposed massive fraud
in a publicly traded company, but not before passing news of
management's transgressions to his clients."' The Court
started its discussion of the analyst's potential insider trad-
sional investment advisor needed more detailed disclosure than the average
investor. See William H. Beaver, Current Trends in Corporate Disclosure, J. OF
ACCOUNTANCY, Jan. 1978, 44-51. In its broadest use, differential disclosure
means any information given only to investment professionals. Id. See also
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR INVESTOR RELATIONS 31 (National Institute of
Investor Relations 1st ed. 1998).
The concept of "differential disclosure" is based on the notion that, or-
dinarily, analysts and portfolio managers need more detailed informa-
tion to make their analyses and assessments regarding a company's
performance and prospects than individual investors or financial re-
porters require. "Differential disclosure" can be a form of selective dis-
closure that can be detrimental to the financial markets when a com-
pany goes into greater detail in its discussions with analysts and
portfolio managers, yet refuses to provide the same level of information
to the media upon request. Should individual investors or reporters
request the sort of detailed information that has been provided to
analysts or portfolio managers, the company should provide it.
Id. In recent years, differential disclosure has become a term of art for de-
scribing earnings guidance given only to investment professionals. See Tele-
phone Interview with Lou Thompson, President of the National Institute for
Investor Relations (January 12, 1998). Under the National Institute's view de-
scribed above, the difference between appropriate and inappropriate disclosure
to analysts (i.e. differential and selective disclosure) is whether the company
will give out the same information to others when queried. This distinction is
hollow when one realizes that those not a part of the professional investment
community have virtually no opportunity to pose questions to management.
151. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
152. Id. at 1230 n.1.
153. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
154. See id. at 648-50.
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ing liability recognizing the important role analysts play in
the market. By "'ferret[ing] out and analyz[ing] information"'
through talks with corporate insiders, analysts are "neces-
sary to the preservation of a healthy market."155 The Court
went on to establish that the analyst defendant could only be
liable for insider trading if the insiders who relayed informa-
tion to him breached their fiduciary duties owed to the com-
pany."' Whether an insider breaches his duty to the com-
pany through disclosure of confidential information depends
on the insider's purpose for the disclosure. 5 ' If the insider
"receives a direct or indirect benefit from the disclosure, such
as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will trans-
late into future earnings" the insider breaches his fiduciary
duty.'58 If the insider discloses material non-public informa-
tion, for a corporate business purpose, not personal gain,
however, no breach occurs."9
Importantly, the court pointed out that under this stan-
dard, an insider violates his fiduciary duty by making a gift
of confidential information to a third party.' ° The Court ex-
plained that in such a case, the insider is deemed to have re-
ceived personal benefit because "the tip and trade resemble
trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits
to the recipient." 6' Recognizing that whether "an insider
personally benefits from a particular disclosure ... will not
always be easy for the courts,""' 2 the Court held that the
analyst was not liable because the insiders who tipped him
were not motivated by their own personal gain or the per-
sonal gain of the analyst but "by a desire to expose fraud.""' 3
The Dirks Court, in effect, set up a safe harbor for in-
sider disclosure to analysts."' The standard allows an in-
155. Id. at 658 (quoting 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1406 (1981)).
156. See id. at 661-62.
157. See id. at 662.
158. Id. at 663.
159. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983).
160. Id. at 664. "The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpub-
lic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential informa-
tion to a trading relative or friend." Id. "The tippers received no monetary or
personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor was their purpose
to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks." Id. at 667.
161. Id. at 664.
162. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
163. Id. at 666.
164. See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider
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sider to disclose confidential information to an analyst as
long as the insider is not motivated by personal gain, not-
withstanding the fact that the information disclosed ulti-
mately provides a trading advantage to the analyst. 165  The
safe harbor presumably does not apply where insiders dis-
close information to analysts that is certain to have a consid-
erable effect on the company's stock price (i.e. providing
analysts with news of a significant revision in its earnings
forecast for the upcoming quarter before issuing a press re-
lease revealing the same), because in such situations the in-
sider is likely to receive a reputational benefit from the dis-
closure.'66  However, where an insider communicates
Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1033-34 (1990).
165. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661-62 (1983).
In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case, the more typical
situation in which there will be a question whether disclosure violates
the insider's Cady, Roberts duty is when insiders disclose information
to analysts. In some situations, the insider will act consistently with
his fiduciary duty to shareholders and yet release of the information
may affect the market. For example, it may not be clear-either to the
corporate insider or to the recipient analyst-whether the information
will be viewed as material nonpublic information. Corporate officials
may mistakenly think the information already has been disclosed or
that it is not material enough to affect the market. Whether disclosure
is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on the purpose of
the disclosure .... Thus, the test is whether the insider personally
will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some
personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to the insiders. And
absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.
Id. (citations omitted).
166. In Stevens v. SEC, 48 S.E.C. Docket 739 (1991), the Chief Executive Of-
ficer of a small corporation traded on the American Stock Exchange called a
number of analysts to tell them that the company would not meet its earlier
earnings forecast one day before disclosing the same in a press release. See
John C. Coffee Jr., The SEC and the Securities Analyst, N.Y.L.J. at 5 (May 30,
1991). The SEC alleged that the CEO breached his fiduciary duty to the com-
pany's shareholders because he received a reputational benefit by pre-releasing
the earnings shortfall to the analyst community. Id. In the end, Mr. Stevens
agreed to a consent decree permanently enjoining him from violating Section
17(a) of the 1933 Act, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5. See SEC v.
Stevens, 48 S.E.C. Docket 739 (1991). Mr. Stevens also agreed to pay over
$126,000, which represented the amount of losses avoided by investors who re-
ceived material nonpublic information as a result of his tips to analysts. See id.
Professor Coffee takes the position that the SEC's reading of "personal
gain" in Stevens is too broad. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Securi-
ties Analyst, N.Y.L.J. May 30, 1991, at 5. He elaborates that Stevens, as the
CEO and a substantial shareholder, pre-released information to a group of
analysts to maintain corporate credibility. Id. Professor Coffee holds that: "to
the extent that any 'reputational benefit' resulted from Stevens' conduct, it ac-
crued to [the company] and all its shareholders proportionately, and thus
EARNINGS PROJECTIONS
information of only slight worth, such as its expectations for
year-ahead earnings, the safe harbor established by Dirks
most likely applies. Under such a scenario, because the cor-
porate practice of giving guidance to analysts is the norm,"'
an insider disclosing such information would be motivated
not by personal gain, but by a corporate desire to maintain
good relations with analysts. 6 ' Regarding the company prac-
tice of disclosing guidance to analysts, the Dirks decision ul-
timately did nothing more than restate the Bausch & Lomb
decision in terms of fiduciary theory.
D. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
1. The Goals of Reform
Congress revisited the topic of company forecasts with
the PSLRA.'69 It passed the legislation to put an end to the
excessive litigation public companies endured as a result of
making forward-looking statements that proved incorrect." °
Although Congress's primary goal, unlike the SEC in 1979,
was not the increase of company projections disseminated to
the public, it believed that by cracking down on non-
meritorious fraud claims, dissemination would follow.
17
'
Congress' particular concern in 1995 was the "strike
suit,"172 a securities action filed not to compensate victims,
but to extort a substantial settlement from a corporation and
other deep pocket defendants such as auditors.'73 In a typical
scenario, after a substantial drop in a company's stock price,
plaintiffs' lawyers would scour public statements attributed
should not amount to a personal gain for purposes of Dirks." Id. Under Profes-
sor Coffee's approach, an insider would not be guilty of insider trading absent a
more direct showing that the analyst sold information "in return for a reputa-
tional benefit that translates into future earnings." Id.
167. See infra note 209.
168. Alternatively, the court could dismiss an insider trading action against
an executive for providing year-ahead guidance discreetly to analysts under the
assumption that such information is not material because of its inherent uncer-
tainty.
169. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (1995).
170. See Statement of Managers, supra note 24, at 31.
171. See Backmun et al., supra note 28, 157.
172. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1995, [1995 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,629, at 86,757 (June 19, 1995) [hereinafter
PSLRA].
173. See Statement of Managers, supra note 24, at 31.
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to management looking for any comment that could be inter-
preted as projecting better times ahead. 7 4  The attorneys
would then institute a 10b-5 class action suit,'75 alleging that
management intentionally made a fraudulent statement con-
cerning its future that artificially inflated the company's
stock price and, therefore, caused later purchasers to over-
pay. 76 Corporations would, in the end, opt to settle the case
regardless of its merits to avoid a myriad of costs: millions of
dollars in discovery and litigation expenses, time drain on top
management, and negative publicity.'77
In addition to causing corporations to expend large sums
of money either in defense or settlement of a frivolous claim,
strike suits had the effect of chilling disclosure of forward-
looking information.'78 Companies, particularly those in bio-
tech, high tech, and other high growth industries, limited the
amount of forward-looking information released to the public
or eliminated such disclosure in order to shield themselves
from litigation.'79 This had the effect of adding to the cost
imposed on public companies by increasing some companies'
perceived riskiness thus forcing them to pay more to secure
capital. 8 ° Congress also believed 10b-5 suits profited lawyers
not plaintiffs. 8' The SEC noted that investors typically re-
covered only 7 to 14 cents for every dollar lost as a result of
fraud.'82
After extensive debate, Congress passed the PSLRA over
President Clinton's veto.'83 The Act tackles the problem of
frivolous litigation primarily in three different ways. First, it
174. See Statement of Managers, supra note 24, at 37.
175. See supra note 147 for elements of a 10b-5 claim.
176. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Promises Made, Promises Kept: Practical Im-
plications of the Securities Litigation Reform Act, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 845,
847 (1996) [hereinafter Pitt et al., Promises Made, Promises Kept].
177. See Statement of Managers, supra note 24, 37. Some commentators be-
lieved that the average settlement rate of 93% for class actions securities fraud
suits lended support to the premise that suits were decided not on the merits
but on the size of the defendants' pocketbooks. See Reform Act 1995, supra
note 172, at 86,760.
178. See Statement of Managers, supra note 24, at 42.




183. See Jeffrey Taylor, House Votes to Override Veto of Securities-Suit Bill,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1995, at A3; Jeffrey Taylor, Congress Sends Business a
Christmas Gift, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1995, at A2.
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attempts to put control of such suits in the hands of real cli-
ents.' Lawyers, before the passage of the PSLRA, would
typically file suit for one of the many "professional plaintiffs"
in their stable.'85 These plaintiffs would be mere figureheads
having no say in the way the litigation turned out.8 ' The
PSLRA requires courts to choose as lead plaintiff the party
most capable of adequately representing the class.'87 It cre-
ates a rebuttable presumption that the most appropriate rep-
resentative will be the party with the "largest financial inter-
est in the relief sought by the class."'88
Second, the legislation raises the bar for what types of
cases make it to trial.' In order to survive a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim,9 ° the complaint must "with
respect to each act or omission alleged ... state with par-
ticularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind." 9' Further-
more, all discovery in the action is stayed while such a
motion is pending.'92 Congress tailored these provisions to
reduce suits that are filed only in hopes of uncovering dam-
aging information in discovery.
Third, the PSLRA grants safe harbor protection to cer-
tain company projections.' Realizing that predictive state-
ments are the object of much securities litigation, Congress
instituted a two pronged safe harbor to mitigate litigation
risk and thus encourage the disclosure of forward-looking in-
formation.95
The PSLRA's safe harbor addresses most of the perceived
deficiencies of the SEC's 1979 safe harbor. First, it protects
forward-looking statements, both oral or written,'9 6 issued by
184. See Pitt et al., Promises Made, Promises Kept, supra note 176, at 848.
185. See Statement of Managers, supra note 24, at 33-34.
186. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Promises Made, Promises Kept, supra note
176, at 848.
187. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-4 (West 1997).
188. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-4 (West 1997).
189. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Promises Made, Promises Kept, supra note
176, at 848-49.
190. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-4 (West 1997).
191. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-4 (West 1997).
192. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-4 (West 1997).
193. See Statement of Managers, supra note 24, at 37.
194. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-5 (West 1997).
195. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Promises Made, Promises Kept, supra note
176, at 849
196. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-5 (West 1997).
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certain parties when made outside of certain security fil-
ings. 97 It provides protection for a written forward-looking
statement if "immaterial" or "identified as a forward-looking
statement and... accompanied by meaningful cautionary
language identifying important factors that could cause ac-
tual results to differ materially from those in the forward-
looking statement."98 The safe harbor is applicable to an oral
forward-looking statement if the statement is "accompanied
by a cautionary statement (i) that the particular statement is
a forward-looking statement and (ii) that the actual results
might differ materially from those projected."'99 An oral pro-
jection must also be accompanied by "an oral statement that
additional information concerning factors that could cause
actual results to materially differ ... is contained in a readily
available written document."2 °° Finally, the safe harbor pro-
tects the defendant if the plaintiff fails to prove that the for-
ward-looking statement was made with actual knowledge
that it was false or misleading.2 °1
The PSLRA touches on the issuer's duty to update, an-
other controversial issue debated in 1979. The safe harbor
states that: "[n]othing in this section shall impose upon any
person a duty to update a forward looking statement.""2 This
section could be interpreted, in favor of companies, as im-
posing no duty to update.2"3 Some commentators believe,
however, that since it does not explicitly strike down an is-
suer's duty to update, some courts might rule that a judicially
created duty to update continues in vitality.
2 4
The safe harbor has important limitations. Coverage
under the safe harbor does not extend to those convicted of
certain felonies or misdeamnors and those issuing penny
stock.2 ' The safe harbor also does not protect projections
made in financial statements or registration statements.2 6
197. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-5 (West 1997).
198. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-5 (West 1997).
199. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-5 (West 1997).
200. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-5 (West 1997).
201. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-5 (West 1997).
202. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-5. (West 1997).
203. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Promises Made, Promises Kept, supra note
176, at 857.
204. See id.
205. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-5 (West 1997).
206. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-5 (West 1997).
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Furthermore, it does not cover statements in connection with
a roll-up transaction, a going private transaction, a tender of-
fer, or an initial public offering."'
2. The Aftermath of Reform
The PSLRA has had no significant effect on company dis-
closure of earnings estimates."8 The vast majority of compa-
nies continue to supply analysts with earnings guidance, yet
balk at disseminating the same information in a press re-
lease.2 °9 Of all the major companies in America, only a small
207. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-5 (West 1997).
208. So far the results regarding frivolous lawsuits are mixed. The number
of federal court filings has decreased moderately, but the total number of secu-
rities fraud cases has remained the same. The number of filings in state court,
where the PSLRA is inapplicable, have increased dramatically. See 1997 WL
14153290 (testimony of Grundfest and Perino) (Oct. 29, 1997).
209. See National Investor Relations Institute, A Study of Corporate Disclo-
sure Practices, May 1998, at 7 (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review) (sur-
vey found 71% of companies express their level of "comfort" with analyst earn-
ings estimates); Lashinsky, supra note 29; Jeffrey M. Laderman, Wall Street's
Spin Game Stock Analysts Often Have a Hidden Agenda, BUS. WK., October 5,
1998, at 150; Pratt, supra note 31 (" Perceptions of companies future prospects,
of course, are a major factor in stock market performance, and regulators are
well aware that top analysts and their institutional clients routinely get a bet-
ter picture of the future than most retail investors do." ); Neil Roland, SEC
Chief Assails Firms on Financial Forecasts Report Says Method Favors Wall
Street, Urges Changes, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (January 24, 1997)
<http://newslibrary.krmediastream.com/cgi-bin/search/ph> ("The problem of
companies giving analysts more forward looking information has been around
for quite some time."). See also Leslie Scism, Firms Increasingly Make End
Runs Around Analysts, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 30, 1993, at C1 ("For years, corpora-
tions manipulated the mood of Wall Street through private conversations with
securities analysts.").
Despite the [PSLRA's] encouragement that companies make what law-
yers call " forward looking" statements, most still prognosticate for
the public as little as possible while parceling out the best stuff to
analysts who can make the most of the information. Their reticence
comes from fear of being sued by shareholders if results fall grossly
short of expectations. So instead, companies " give guidance"
through an elaborate system of winks and nudges.
For example, a company' s chief financial officer will meet with a mu-
tual fund manager. The CFO listens, say to the investors' estimate
for quarterly earnings and then will make utterances like, " Well, I
can' t tell you the correct figure, but I think you' re being too conserva-
tive."
Lashinsky, supra note 29.
By and large [analyst] estimates do little more than parrot the com-
pany line. Consider that over the last 20 years the range of analyst es-
timates has narrowed from 8% to 4% according to I/B/E/S Inc., which
collects and distributes earnings estimates to the Street. That sug-
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minority take notice of the individual investor, regularly pro-
viding earnings guidance in press releases and postings on
the Internet.21 The most prominent companies in this disclo-
sure camp are Intel and PeopleSoft.21'
PeopleSoft's approach to investor relations is particularly
innovative and worth discussing in detail.212 The company
"seeks to create a level playing field of financial and business
information, both historical and prospective, that is univer-
gests that analysts are doing less original work and hewing closer to
the company service.
Jefferey M. Laderman, Wall Street's Spin Game Stock Analysts Often Have a
Hidden Agenda, BUS. WK., October 5, 1998, at 150.
[Typically companies hold a] 2:00 p.m. conference call, West Coast
Time, after the market closes .... [The conference call ends at] 3:00
p.m. and then the analysts call in one by one from 3:00 p.m. until 7:00
p.m. talking to the CFO getting.., the guidance ranges. I have some
companies that literally will build your entire [profit and loss state-
ment] for you. [Companies say] we want your revenues in this range,
your margins in this range, your earnings in this range, and if you are
outlying that range they get [angry].
Todd Bakar, Director of Research Hambrecht & Quist, Remarks at Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher Conference: Emerging Issues: Dealing with Analysts and the
Financial Press (October 30, 1998) (transcript on file with the Santa Clara Law
Review) [hereinafter Bakar].
210. See National Investor Relations Institute, supra note 209 (survey found
26% of companies routinely forecast quarterly earnings in communications (in-
cluding conference calls) with investors). See also Lashinsky, supra note 29.
211. See Lashinsky, supra note 29.
212. Some of the information regarding PeopleSoft was supplied by Ronald
E.F. Codd, the Chief Financial Officer of PeopleSoft until Dec. 30, 1998. At that
time, Mr. Codd stepped aside to take the position of Chief Executive Officer at
Momentum Business Applications Inc., a company recently spun-off by People-
Soft. See PeopleSoft, Inc. Appoints Ronald E.F. Codd As CEO of Momentum
Business Applications, Inc. and Alfred Castino as CFO of PeopleSoft <http://
Checkers.peoplesoft.com/Events.nsf/NewsByDate?OpenView&Expand=l. 1>.
The key aspects of the company's disclosure model have not changed since Mr.
Codd's departure. See Investor Communications Policy Supplement (visited
March 27, 1999) <http://www.peoplesoft.com/en/corporateinfo/
investorrelations/resourcesen.html> [hereinafter PeopleSoft Policy].
In one other important recent development, PeopleSoft has come under fire
for its accounting practices. See Adam Lashinsky, Hard Lesson For PeopleSoft
It Falls To Earth With Other Companies, SAN JOSE MERCURY, Jan. 29, 1999, at
Cl; Adam Lashinsky, After Overcoming One Challenge To Its Accounting Prac-
tices, It Faces Another People's Party May Be Premature, SAN JOSE MERCURY,
Feb. 19, 1999, at C1. Although the SEC has investigated the company and an-
nounced that it will not have to restate earnings for prior periods, see People-
Soft Passes SEC Test, SAN JOSE MERCURY, Feb. 18, 1999, at C1, a number of
class action claims are still pending against the company, see SEC Completes




sally available to all in the investment community."21 As
PeopleSoft's former Chief Financial Officer, Ronald E.F.
Codd, was fond of saying: "Any information that [the com-
pany] give[s] out, [it] want[s] your grandmother who lives in
Oklahoma to know too."2"4 As a result, PeopleSoft, utilizing
the safe harbor provided by the PSLRA, provides forward-
looking information only in earnings releases.215 These an-
nouncements, which are transmitted over the business wire
213. PeopleSoft Policy, supra note 212.
214. See Ronald E.F. Codd, Former Chief Financial Officer, PeopleSoft Inc.,
Remarks at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Conference: Emerging Issues: Dealing
with Analysts and the Financial Press (October 30, 1998) (transcript on file
with Santa Clara Law Review) [hereinafter Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Confer-
ence].
215. See PeopleSoft Policy, supra note 212. In the unusual case where the
company opts to supplement the forward-looking information in its earnings
release, it will only do so by issuing another press release. Id. PeopleSoft will
comment about business conditions to analysts or investors if contacted within
the first two months of any quarter. Id. Mr. Codd explains that any informa-
tion the company dispenses during this time is not going to give anyone an in-
dication of whether the company is going to meet its forecast. See Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher Conference, supra note 214. Most of the company's sales, like
other Silicon Valley companies, take place toward the end of the quarter. Id.
Information accrued within the first two months is simply inconclusive as to
eventual quarterly results. Id. The company goes into a quiet period beginning
around the first day of the third month of the quarter. See PeopleSoft Policy,
supra note 212. (This coincides with the closure of internal stock buying. In-
siders who wish to purchase PeopleSoft stock must wait until the company's
quarterly results are posted.). This means the company will only answer ques-
tions regarding historical information. Id. If the company wants to inform the
market about any new developments during this time it will issue a press re-
lease. Id.
As part of their investor relations program, PeopleSoft also occasionally
holds conference calls at the end of the quarter and attends analyst confer-
ences. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Conference, supra note 214. During these
encounters, it does not disclose new information. Id. Once the conversation
inevitably turns to earnings estimates, the PeopleSoft representative will refer
back to the prior company document which contains the forward-looking projec-
tions and the appropriate safe harbor qualifying language. Id. PeopleSoft
posts its conference calls, Conference Call Fourth Quarter & Year Ending Dec.
31, 1998 (visited March 27, 1999) <http:www.peoplesoft.com/en/
corporate-info/investorrelations/calenderen.html>, and the slides presented
at conferences on its webpage, see NationsBancMontgomery Tech Week '99 (vis-
ited March 27, 1999) <http:www.peoplesoft.com/en/corporate-info/investor
_relations/calenderen.html>. Some companies tackle the investment confer-
ence differently. Intel and Microsoft, for example, provide real time audio links
through their website. See Intel 1998 Fall Analyst Meeting (visited March 27,
1999) <http://www.intel.com/intel/finance/disclaim _fallanalyst.htm>; Greg Maf-
fei, CFO, Microsoft Keynote Presentation Credit Suisse First Boston Technology
Conference (visited March 27, 1999) <http://www. micro-
soft.com/msft/speech/maffeicsfb.htm>.
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and reprinted on the company's website, detail the company's
projections for revenues, operating margins, other income,
and tax rates."6 All that is left for interested parties is to
plug in the numbers and do the math. An operations review,
which is posted on the company's website on the day of the
earnings release, provides in depth historical information
about the company's business.217 Most companies typically
supply this level of historical information only to analysts.
The fact that most companies do not follow the disclosure
paradigm embraced by Intel and PeopleSoft has not gone un-
noticed."8 Lou Thompson, President of the National Investor
Relations Institute, states that the overwhelming majority of
corporate executives comment on earnings projections dis-
creetly to analysts.219 John Lifton, a New York lawyer and
216. See Fourth Quarter Sales and Earnings 1998 (visited March 27, 1999)
<http:www.peoplesoft.com/en/corporate info/investorrelations/pdf/
PSFTQ498.pdf. Mr. Codd relates that most corporate executives are shocked at
the level of public disclosure PeopleSoft provides and believe that the company
is leaving itself more vulnerable to liability than if it just reserved such infor-
mation for analysts. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Conference supra note 214. Mr.
Codd disagrees. Id. He argues that by utilizing the safe harbor in the PSLRA
and sticking to a strict policy of providing only written guidance the company
significantly decreases its liability risk. Id. First, by disclosing only written
guidance, the probability that someone will allege that PeopleSoft has selec-
tively tipped analysts about earnings surprises is slim. Id. Second, by provid-
ing only written guidance, the company more effectively reduces its liability
risk arising from "analysts' estimates inflation creep." Id. The process plays
out as follows. Analysts believe the company is being too conservative and thus
disregard management's guidance. Id. When earnings results come in below
aggressive analyst numbers, but in line with company expectations, the stock
price drops precipitously. Id. If a shareholder files suit as a result, arguing
fraud through the company's manipulation of analysts (for a discussion of 10b-5
liability and the entanglement theory see supra note 147), PeopleSoft is in a
better position to defend itself than otherwise. Id. If it had been whispering
guidance discreetly to analysts it could not bring this information up for fear
that the court would disregard it completely or even use it against the company
as proof of the close level of contact between the company and the analyst
community. Id. With earnings guidance in print, the company has credible
evidence that it was the analyst not the company that caused the unjustified
stock price. Id. Incidentally, the practice of providing written earnings guid-
ance also reduces the likelihood of 'analysts' estimates inflation creep." Id. An
analyst must feel particularly confident about his numbers before disagreeing
with management, because he will have to justify such forecasts to clients who
all have access to the company's views.
217. See Operations Review Fourth Quarter 1998 (visited Mar. 27, 1999)
<http://www.peoplesoft.com/en/corporate-info/investorreltions/pdf/
Q498ops.pdf>.
218. See Lashinsky, supra note 29.
219. See Elizabeth Mooney, Attention to Wording is Essential to Avoid Secu-
1999] EARNINGS PROJECTIONS 849
one time head of the American Bar Association's committee
on federal regulation of securities, agrees."2 Arthur Levitt,
the Chairman of the SEC, has voiced his concern with earn-
ings guidance disclosed only to analysts. In late 1996, during
a speech to 500 securities lawyers and academics, Levitt
stated, "[one area that is ripe for improvement is forward-
looking disclosure provided by companies. Analysts typically
get this information in conference calls with senior manage-
ment. Other investors rarely have such an opportunity."221
Why is there concern about differential disclosure in the
90s? Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act 222 forbid cor-
porate insiders or tippees from trading in company securities
on the basis of material nonpublic information if such trading
breaches the insider's fiduciary duty to the company.2 Cor-
porate managers know their company much better than both
the individual and professional investor and thus they are in
a much better position to gauge the company's earnings pros-
pects.224 A more accurate earnings assessment is of great im-
portance to all market players as investors in today's mar-
ketplace make investment decisions on the basis of future
earnings. In the words of former SEC Chairman Breedon,
rities Lawsuit, RADIO COMMUNICATIONS REPORT (Dec. 15, 1997)
<http://www.rcrnews.com/archive/article.html>.
220. See Roland, supra note 209.
221. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt,
Corporate Finance in the Information Age, Remarks at Securities Regulation
Institute Conference (Jan. 23, 1997) (visited Dec. 29, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/
news/speeches/spch 135.txt>. Mr. Levitt has continued to speak on the topic of
corporate disclosure to analysts. Recently, however, his remarks have focused
on the practice of providing analysts with information right before it is an-
nounced publicly. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur
Levitt, A Question of Integrity: Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting In-
sider Trading, Remarks at "SEC Speaks" Conference (Feb. 27, 1998) (visited
Dec. 29, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/news/ speeches/spch202.txt> ("My prefer-
ence is that calls to analysts should not come before a press release, and that-
even then-these discussions should not divulge new material information not
contained in that press release."); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman Arthur Levitt, The "Numbers Game," Remarks at NYU Center of
Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998) (visited Dec. 29, 1998) <http:/ www.sec.gov
/news/speeches/spch220.txt> ("Seven months ago, I expressed concerns about
selective disclosure. Through conference calls or embargoed press releases,
analysts and institutional investors often hear about material news before it is
made public. In the interval, there is a great deal of unusual trading.").
222. See supra note 145.
223. See United States v. 0' Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
224. See Kripke, supra note 60, at 1198.
225. See Heller, supra note 53, at 304. See also Langevoort, supra note 164,
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"Understanding a company's own assessment of its future po-
tential is among the most valuable information shareholders
and potential shareholders could have about a firm."226
The disclosure of earnings guidance227-information that
most, if not all, would consider material-to a discrete few,
who then pass on the information to clients trading in the
market, thus seems to offend the insider trading laws.228
at 1029. Long-term forecasts or projections are "material to any informed in-
vestment decision." Id.
226. Statement of Managers, supra note 24, at 42-43.
227. In the author's experience as a Junior Securities Analyst at the Value
Line Investment Survey, companies give earnings guidance for periods covering
the quarter ahead to the year ahead. Companies who comment on results soon
to be reported are not giving earnings guidance in the sense referred to by this
article. These companies are pre-releasing actual earnings for some period of
time-whether it be a month or some period up to quarter. This type of corpo-
rate practice is clearly prohibited by the insider trading laws. See supra note
166 and accompanying text.
228. Assuming management can most accurately forecast the company's
earnings prospects, if management only releases its forecasts to a discrete
few-certain analysts and by association the analysts' clients-these individu-
als have an obvious information advantage over the rest of the market. Al-
though hard to quantify, this information advantage yields a trading advan-
tage. Take the following example. Management, having previously been silent,
discloses to a few analysts that it is comfortable with current analyst consensus
estimates for the upcoming quarter. This disclosure seems fairly innocuous on
its face, but nevertheless it does provide the tippees with a distinct advantage.
Generally, the market sets the company's stock price by factoring in the com-
pany's expected earnings and the riskiness of those earnings. The higher the
risk surrounding those earnings the lower the stock price. The lower the risk
the higher the stock price (investors demand compensation for taking on risk
and thus will only buy risky securities at a discount). At the time the company
makes its earnings disclosures, the market has made an assessment of the
stock's riskiness. This risk assessment, however, does not reflect news of the
company's recent endorsement of consensus earnings. This endorsement ar-
guably makes the stock less risky. Those who receive the tip from management
calculate the value of the company's stock. Their valuation of the stock yields a
price higher than the current market price, reflecting their assessment of lower
company risk. These individuals proceed to buy the stock at the current mar-
ket price. Holding other factors about the stock constant, the price of the stock
will eventually inch up to the price calculated by the tippees. Why? The tip-
pees or even the company itself will pass on news of the company's confidence,
stimulating demand for the stock (i.e. more investors will realize that the riski-
ness of the company's prospects is lower than previously believed and thus bid
up the stock price). Even if the company or its tippees do not pass on the news
of the announcement to a significant number of other market participants, the
stock price will creep up when the company eventually reports earnings. Under
the facts of this hypothetical, assuming management reports earnings in line
with their estimates and analyst consensus, the stock price will capture the dis-
count, however slight, that the market factored into the price to compensate
investors for uncertainty surrounding the earnings report.
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Surely the five to seven million investors who trade individ-
ual stocks on the Internet22 9 are interested in the information
that analysts receive and are offended by the practice of dif-
ferential disclosure.23 ° But at the same time, the important
role an analyst plays in making the market more efficient-
more "fair" in terms of pricing-is undeniable.23  Does the
SEC really want to interfere with the delicate relationship be-
tween analysts and companies?
3. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
In 1998, company disclosure has again been in the news.
After the passage of the PSLRA in late 1995, Congress found
that plaintiffs were sidestepping the Act's reforms.232 Instead
of filing securities class action suits in federal court where
the provisions of the PSLRA were applicable, plaintiffs were
opting for state court, where plaintiff-friendly state law ap-
plied.233 To close this loophole, Congress passed the Securi-
ties Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA),234
which mandates the removal of certain securities class action
suits from state to federal court.3 Proponents of the law be-
lieve that the legislation will accomplish what the PSLRA set
out to do. 36 First, it will reduce the amount of frivolous law-
suits endured by companies listed on the national ex-
changes.237 This will in turn lead more companies to release
229. See When the bubble burst, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1999, at 25.
230. Investors who do not subscribe to professional research are totally shut
out from earnings guidance. It is true that these investors can access consen-
sus estimates on line, see <http://www.yahoo.com>, but these estimates are
typically not updated in a timely fashion. Investors who rely on consensus es-
timates as well as investors who buy professional research encounter one other
big problem: these investors have no way of knowing if the analyst received the
company forecast. An estimate originating from the company and ratified by
an analyst arguably holds more weight than an estimate formulated by an
analyst on his own.
231. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983)
232. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-353, 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (1998).
233. See id.
234. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
235. See Clinton Signs Law Making Securities Class Actions a Federal Case,
LIAB. WK. (Nov. 9, 1998).
236. See Clinton Statement on Uniform Standards Act, U.S. Newswire, No-
vember 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13607107.
237. See id.
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earnings projections to the general public,238 instead of pro-
viding such estimates only to the analyst community.239
Anecdotal evidence indicates that if Congress is serious
about encouraging company disclosure of earnings forecasts
to the public, closing the current litigation loophole by pre-
empting state security law may not provide the answer.
Some market professionals believe that the majority of com-
panies will not start disseminating earnings projections to
240the public in the near future. Many managers seem to be
less concerned about the possibility of lawsuits than the im-
age problems they would have if their forecasts were sub-
stantially off the mark.2 ' Others in the industry, however,
are more sanguine. One high ranking corporate executive
believes that after the courts iron out the particulars of the
PSLRA242 over the next couple of years and company boards
become confident that their good faith projections will not ex-
pose them to frivolous suits, most companies will release
projections directly to public.243 Under either viewpoint, the
majority of large corporations is unlikely to release ball park
238. See id. ("If firms know that they can rely on the Reform Act's "safe har-
bor" for forward-looking information, they will provide the public with valuable
information about their prospects, thus benefiting investors by enabling them
to make wiser decisions.").
239. See supra note 209.
240. See Tom Pratt, supra note 31.
Equity capital market pros said last week that they see no signs that
companies are going to start including earnings projections in prospec-
tuses, for example. 'Our guess is that behavior is going to change very
slowly,' said Scott Sipprelle, head of Morgan Stanley & Co.'s equity
syndicate desk. He observed that many managers seem to be con-
cerned less about the possibility of lawsuits than about the 'image
problems' they would have if overly bullish forecasts didn't pan out.
Id.
241. Id.
242. The major question surrounding the PSLRA is the pleading standard
requirement. There is some debate as to whether Congress intended to adopt
the Second Circuit standard, the most stringent circuit court test, or an even
stricter standard. See Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading Re-
quirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 675 (1996). One secu-
rities lawyer believes three things must happen before more companies start to
put guidance in press releases: 1) the PSLRA's pleading standard must be clari-
fied, 2) the number of securities class action lawsuits filed must drop, and 3)
the number of securities class action lawsuits dismissed before trial must in-
crease. Telephone Interview with Steven Bochner, attorney at Wilson, Sonsini,
Goodrich & Rosati (January 10, 1999).
243. Telephone Interview with Ronald E.F. Codd, Chief Executive Officer of
Momentum Business Applications, Inc. and Former Chief Financial Officer of
PeopleSoft Inc. (October 28, 1998).
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guidance publicly any time soon.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Companies may respond to analysts' questions about
earnings estimates provided they do "not go overboard" and
are "not trying to give their stock a little jiggle." '" Analysts
use this company guidance not merely to check their own
projections but in fact to formulate them.245 Individual inves-
tors are shut out completely from this very important infor-
mation and thus handicapped in the trading market.2" Be-
cause the PSLRA has not achieved its intended goal of
increased dissemination of earnings estimates to the public
and the recent passage of the SLUSA may not spur most
companies to release such information any time soon,"'
should the SEC change current policy regarding company
disclosure of earnings projections? If it decides the current
system of differential disclosure does not comport with the
1933 and 1934 Acts and reform is in the public's best inter-
est, what course of action should it take?
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The SEC's Early Views on Company Earnings Projections
The SEC's early policy of prohibiting earnings projec-
tions... in securities filings must be examined in light of cur-
rent circumstances. The country in the late 1930s was still
reeling from the worst financial crisis of its history, the Great
Depression.2"9 With the nation's faith in the market at ex-
tremely low levels,6 the SEC's choice to take a more protec-
tionist approach in dealing with earnings projections cannot
be faulted. The prospect of further fraud on the individual
investor in the form of unrealistic earnings projections could
have undermined market confidence even more, leading to a
244. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
245. See 1977 Report, supra note 8, at 55; Laderman, supra note 209, at 150.
246. See note 230.
247. See discussion supra Part II.D.
248. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
249. H. R. REP. No. 85, at 1-2 (1933) (President Roosevelt' s address to Con-
gress).
250. H. R. REP. NO. 85, at 1.
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less efficient market."1 Furthermore, one of the SEC's justi-
fications-investors are just as able to predict the future as
corporate executives 252 -arguably might not have been too off
the mark in the 1930s. At that time, the science of budgeting
was not as advanced, so the disparity between the individual
and the corporate executive in terms of forecasting was not
as great as it is today.
By the 1970s the SEC prohibition was certainly on more
dubious footing. Management of bigger companies used pro-
jections extensively and their in depth knowledge of opera-
tions certainly gave them a clearer picture of potential earn-
ings than the average investor. In 1970, Professor Homer
Kripke related:
Generalizing broadly, it is known that most sizable corpo-
rations use projections of future sales and revenues as the
basis for making very important decisions .... Moreover,
a whole science, a branch of accounting known as budget
planning is based on projections; and libraries on econom-
ics and on business are full of texts on the subject ....
The management, which has the greatest stake in the
matter, and which may have spent months of labor in its
projections, certainly is in a better position than the public
to forecast where the company is going.153
Furthermore, other SEC justifications for prohibition
were questionable. The idea that company assessments of
earnings prospects had only limited value (i.e. were mere
conjecture) to the ordinary investor was inaccurate. Profes-
sor Schneider reflected in 1972 what everyone long knew:
"[Investors] are partly sold, and particularly in the new issue
area, by verbal assurances about the prospects of the com-
pany. Such projections are at least as valuable, if not more
so, than the past three year's financial record."254 In addition,
why would the SEC have faced an impossible task in policing
the reasonableness of earnings projections? In the 1970s, the
SEC already allowed companies to estimate mineral re-
sources, something just as speculative. 55 The lifting of the
251. H. R. REP. No. 85, at 1-2.
252. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
253. Kripke, supra note 60, at 1197.
254. Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 254, 255 (1972).
255. See Kripke, supra note 60, at 1197.
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prohibition of earnings projections, therefore, was probably
long overdue when the SEC changed its policy in 1973.
B. Differential Disclosure
Although the SEC outlawed selective disclosure when it
decided to allow projections in security filings in 1973,256 it
later acquiesced to differential disclosure even though the dif-
ference between the two disclosure techniques was mini-
mal.257  With selective disclosure a company calls analysts
and provides them its earnings projections.258 Under differ-
ential disclosure, an analyst calls a company, presents its
earnings estimate, and then asks the company for comment.
Companies could respond by stating whether or not the ana-
lyst's estimate was in the "ball park." 9 If a company re-
sponded that an estimate was outside of the ball park, hu-
man nature tells us that the next question posed by the
analysts would be whether another number was in the ball
park.26° Eventually, after enough too-hot or too-cold guid-
ance, the analyst would basically be left with the company's
assessment.26'
If selective disclosure262 was bad for the market and the
tendency for abuse with its close cousin differential disclo-
sure263 was inevitable, why would the SEC allow the practice?
First, the court approved differential disclosure had limits.
Companies could not "go overboard."264  If the information
provided by the company was too valuable, and hence the
stock price moved significantly, the company "guidance"
would not be called differential disclosure, but instead selec-
tive disclosure violative of insider trading.265
256. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
257. See discussion supra Part II.C.
258. See discussion supra Part II.C.
259. See discussion supra Part II.C.
260. See Carl W. Schneider, Public Disclosures, Inside Information, and Re-
lationships with the Financial Community, 465 PLI/CORP. 63, 86 (1984).
261. See id.
262. See supra note 144.
263. See supra note 150.
264. See discussion supra Part II.C.
265. See Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 1980)
("The stockbroker was left with the impression that 'the second quarter was
going to be very poor,' which he considered significant enough to prompt the
sale. We therefore conclude that the ... tip was one of material inside infor-
mation."
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Second, analyst relations with companies were thought
good for the market.266 By ferreting out nonpublic informa-
tion, analysts made the market more efficient-i.e. more ac-
curate in terms of pricing.2 67 Accordingly, some commenta-
tors believed that by shutting down the informal analyst
information network market efficiency would lessen.26
Third, there was no viable alternative for equalizing in-
formation access among professionals and individual inves-
tors. If a company wanted to supply its shareholders, for ex-
ample, with the same information it supplied analysts, it
would be forced as former General Counsel of the SEC Philip
Loomis stated, "'to send [its] stockholders something the size
of a telephone book.'
269
Fourth, the SEC allowed differential disclosure because
it reduced a company's litigation risk if their good faith pro-
jections turned out to be wrong.27 ° Because most company
comments regarding earnings were made orally to analysts in
one-on-one meetings 7' the chance that these statements
would later come back to be used against it in a 10b-5 action
was substantially less than if the same statements were
made in a press release. Without such protection from litiga-
tion risk, many companies may have totally denied the mar-
ket their valuable projections.272 Presumably, due to their so-
phistication, analysts were able to tell the difference between
reasonably based estimates and estimates designed to give
the company's stock "a little jiggle."272 If an analyst felt the
estimates were misleading then he or she would not dissemi-
nate such estimates and fraud would be avoided. 74
The policy reasons above, even if valid when formulated
in the 1970s, are not compelling today. The idea that differ-
ential disclosure is allowable because it only permits some,
but not "too much," information to flow via the informal ana-
266. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648-50 (1983).
267. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
268. See Beaver, supra note 150, at 51.
269. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
270. See Dennis, supra note 58, at 1217.
271. See SEC Release 5362, supra note 2, at 82,665.
272. See id. at 82,666.





lyst network is deficient for a number of reasons. First, it of-
fends the concept of "fair" disclosure, which led to the prohi-
bition on selective disclosure.275 Fair disclosure implies equal
access of information to all investors.276 It is a black and
white concept.177 If you allow one group more access, then the
disclosure ceases to be fair.278 Second, allowing only a little
inside information is not an insignificant event. If analysts
are privy to information, which provides them with only a
slight trading advantage, their benefit would likely be only a
few percentage points in investment return.2 9 Over the long
run, even just a few percentage points of extra return may
add up to a significant dollar amount. The clients of an ana-
lyst or even the analyst himself, if he trades on his own,
should not be entitled to such a subsidy.28 °
The premise that without differential disclosure analysts
would be unable to do their job and hence the market would
be inefficient is also weak. Proponents of such an argument
believe that by allowing a company to respond to analysts'
queries on future earnings the market is better off than if
companies could only disclose such information directly to the
public.21  These proponents feel the informal question and
answer process is of essential importance. Assuming com-
pany executives are not tricked by analysts into disclosing
more than they are willing, however, the benefits of differen-
tial disclosure are not readily discernible. How could market
275. See Beaver, supra note 150, at 51.
276. See id. at 51. The Supreme Court has rejected the "information the-
ory"-that the antifraud provisions require equal information among all trad-
ers. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983). The theory the Court em-
braces, the misappropriation theory, see supra note 145, however, is only a
slightly modified version of it. Both theories, in practice, require equal infor-
mation among traders in most situations. See supra note 166. The misappro-
priation theory, however, only recognizes exceptions to this general rule in un-
usual circumstances. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.22 (1983)
(discussing Walton v. Morgan Stanley, 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980), which held
no violation of the insider trading laws where investment bank, in the course of
investigating a company as a possible acquisition candidate for a client, re-
ceived confidential material nonpublic information from the target company




279. See Langevoort, supra note 164, at 1046.
280. See Beaver, supra note 150, at 51; Langevoort, supra note 164, at 1046.
281. See Langevoort, supra note 164, at 1028.
1999] 857
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
efficiency be hurt if the same information regarding earnings
projections was disseminated to more individuals, the gen-
eral public, then to less, certain members of the analyst
population?282 Market efficiency should arguably increase not
lessen as a result of wider dissemination.283 If anything, the
current system of differential disclosure holds back market
efficiency by giving some analysts a monopoly in the trade of
certain information.284 There are currently over five to seven
million Internet traders who buy and sell securities with lit-
tle or no "professional" research.285 Surely this segment of the
population would be interested in management's projections
and use them to formulate their own interpretations of a cor-
rect valuation for any given security.
Some might debate whether companies would ever dis-
close publicly what they currently disclose only to analysts.2 6
If companies were not given the easy option of disseminating
their earnings projections to the market through differential
disclosure, the market would demand such information di-
rectly. Companies would then be forced to compete on infor-
mation.287 Investors would value more highly those compa-
nies with open disclosure policies, perceiving them as less
risky than those with closed-lipped policies.8 If companies
did not want to see the performance of their stock suffer they
would release to the investing public the in-depth informa-
tion they currently release only to analysts.288
Advocates of differential disclosure articulate three spe-
cific rationales why an informal analyst disclosure system of
all types of information, not just earnings guidance, is better
than a direct disclosure system in terms of market effi-
282. See Beaver, supra note 150, at 51.
283. See id.
If there is limited dissemination of the item, the competition in inter-
preting its implications cannot take place. It is one thing to have pro-
fessionals compete with one another for the interpretations of a pub-
licly disclosed item. It is quite another for one analyst (and the
analyst' s clients) to have exclusive access to that item.
Id.
284. See id.
285. See When the bubble burst, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1999, at 25.
286. See Langevoort, supra note 164, at 1028-1031.





ciency."9 First, companies can release sensitive information
into the market more quickly.291 A company, for instance,
may have a new product in the pipeline that it believes will
generate substantial new sales.292 The company wants this
information disseminated to the marketplace to receive the
reward of a higher stock price, but it does not want its com-
petitors to learn of the product.293 By disclosing the informa-
tion to an analyst on the assumption that the analyst will
factor it into his or her earnings projections, but refrain from
passing on the specifics of the development to others, the
company can release the information to the market without
really releasing it.294 The company achieves the best of both
worlds, the increase of its stock price and the avoidance of
tipping off competitors.295 The advantage of differential dis-
closure here assumes that the company trusts the analyst
and that the analyst will remain faithful to his or her prom-
ise of non-disclosure of the specific development. These are
very big assumptions. Companies recognize that analysts
have an incentive to release specifics of any new develop-
ment, at least informally to bigger accounts in order to more
effectively influence decisions and curry favor.296 Companies
would be remiss in believing that if it provides good non-
public information to analysts it will not reach the competitor
eventually.
A second pro-differential disclosure efficiency argument
involves the credibility of the company.297 The theory main-
tains that information coming directly from the company will
naturally be distrusted by the public and thus unjustly dis-
290. See Langevoort, supra note 164, at 1028-31.





296. See Jonathan C. Dickey, The New 'Entanglement' Theory: Securities
Analysts Are Sued in Class Action Complaints, INSIGHTS, March 1995, at 3, 5.
[I]f the affiliated analyst is significantly more aggressive in his or her
earnings forecasts that the street consensus, his or her forecast is
likely to be ignored. Similarly, if the affiliated analyst attempts to
publish positive forward-looking information [that] is not in any way
attributable to a company source, many institutional investors will
view the information with skepticism.
Id.
297. See Langevoort, supra note 164, at 1030.
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counted.298 If the same information comes from the analyst it
will be better received. 99 Thus, because of differential disclo-
sure, the stock price will more truly reflect the companies'
underlying value. Assuming that an analyst is more believ-
able than a company, why is deception surrounding the
source of information necessary to achieve efficiency gains?
If a company releases information to the public and the ana-
lyst then agrees with the company's assessment, the stock
price should wind up in the same place.
The third justification for differential disclosure in terms
of efficiency is the carrot argument. °° Analysts will not con-
tinue to research unless companies reward them for their
diligence.3 ' By allowing companies to give information to
analysts, which they do not disclose to the public, companies
effectively reward analysts and thus encourage more re-
search by analysts, thereby increasing market efficiency." 2
The underlying premise of this theory is that analysts receive
their best information about a company from the company it-
self. If this is true, is not the whole analyst system a waste
of resources? Could not the company, by cutting out the
analyst-middleman and releasing information directly to the
public, cut off this analyst welfare program, saving the public
the analyst tax and freeing up human capital for a more pro-
ductive use? To think that analysts' get their best informa-
tion about a company from the company itself, however, is
simply naive. Analysts are not important to the market be-
cause of the access to information they possess, but because
of their interpretation of the information to which they have
access.0 Good analysts take what a company gives them and
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 1031.
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Conference, supra note 214.
I think it is fair to take the perspective that we're doing the analysts'
job for them by writing up the operation review, by giving them all this
written guidance. But the fact of the matter is that's exactly where the
analyst should come in and begin to add value. [The analyst] should
critically take our numbers, our guidance, our information and cross
correlate it with other sources of information, [I trends in the industry,
information they have on competitors and either validate it by, in ef-
fect, confirming the guidance or [disagree with it,] by taking a different
position. [W]e certainly encourage our analysts to do that. We've had
a few [analysts] that have, initially when we started this practice, react
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puts it to the test."°4 They talk to suppliers, customers, and
competitors."5 Most of their best information comes from
these sources not the company.0 6 Analysts in the end are
important to the market because they assess management's
assessment of future prospects.0 ' When they recognize an
unjustified stock valuation in the market, their hard work is
rewarded without company involvement.
The difficulty of distributing information is another ar-
gument that fails to justify the current policy of differential
disclosure. Former SEC General Counsel Loomis' comment,
that a company would have to send its shareholders a tele-
phone book in order to maintain an equitable disclosure pol-
icy,08 is more hyperbole than reality. What is most impor-
tant to the investor is not every piece of information a
company gives to an analyst. The investor, like the profes-
sional analyst, is most interested in the conclusions man-
agement draws from every little piece of information. Those
conclusions, in the form of projections, coupled with certain
key underlying assumptions, would likely only take a few
pages of a press release, which is certainly not cost prohibi-
tive. Furthermore, even if Mr. Loomis is right, that an equi-
table disclosure policy would require the shipment of a tele-
phone book to each shareholder,0 9 it would likely be less
costly with today's technology to send that telephone book
than to continue the differential disclosure system. Through
the differential disclosure system companies not only have to
come up with the telephone book, but also present it on nu-
merous occasions to different analysts.310 Such presentations
as "you're doing my job for me" and I said no I'm not, I'm not even be-
ginning to do your job if you do it right.
Id. See also Scism, supra note 209. "Of course, few analysts rely solely on
cryptic conversations with executives to pin down future earnings. The best
combine these conversations with material gleaned from other sources, like
customers, suppliers, distributors, and anyone else in the know." Id.
304. See Gibson, Dunn &.Crutcher Conference supra note 214.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See id. As a result, analyst opinions will always be important to a sig-
nificant number of people no matter if companies continue to disclose informa-
tion under the informal system or instead release information under an open
disclosure model.
308. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
309. See id.
310. See Bakar, supra note 209.
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take up valuable company resources in terms of labor. With
Internet disclosure, the time to write the telephone book is
the same, but by posting the information on the Internet only
one presentation is required. Companies could then reallo-
cate their resources for more efficient uses.
Additionally, the legal benefits derived from differential
disclosure are not enough to justify the retention of the dis-
closure practice. Through differential disclosure, the argu-
ment goes, companies who release good faith earnings guid-
ance to analysts are more unlikely to get hauled into court to
defend 10b-5 fraud claims, because only analysts know of the
projections.31' Honest companies thus save money.32  It is
true that differential disclosure provides less opportunity for
a company to get sued. But it allows both honest companies
and dishonest companies to avoid litigation. Is this a proper
solution? A better solution is the creation of judicial safe-
guards to prevent non-meritorious claims from going forward.
Congress has done just that with the passage of the PSLRA.
The PSLRA raises the pleading requirement so federal courts
are more apt to dispose of non-meritorious cases before
trial.313 During the pendency of a motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to meet the pleading standard, discovery is stayed, so
companies do not incur significant expenses defending such
actions."4 The passage of the SLUSA provides additional
protection to honest companies by effectively preempting
plaintiff-friendly state security law.31'
If the PSLRA and the SLUSA diminish honest compa-
nies' litigation risk, should not differential disclosure of
earnings estimates accordingly disappear? Honest compa-
nies would not incur expenses as a result of an open disclo-
sure policy. Companies would then adopt a more open disclo-
sure policy, issuing projections to the general public on the
assumption that it would lower its perceived riskiness and
311. See Dennis, supra note 58, at 1217-18.
312. The second part of this argument states that without the decreased risk
of litigation that differential disclosure provides, companies would refrain from
providing analysts with guidance altogether. With less information in the mar-
ketplace, market efficiency would accordingly suffer. See Langevoort, supra
note 164, at 1029-30.
313. See discussion supra Part II.D.1.
314. See discussion supra Part II.D.1.
315. See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
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increase its stock price.316 Unfortunately, this scenario has
not played out and may not play out in the near future. An-
ecdotal evidence suggests that companies do not adopt more
open disclosure policies not because of litigation risk, but be-
cause of image problems if their projections prove inaccu-
rate.317 Under a less cynical viewpoint, most major compa-
nies will release their projections, but it will take some
time."8 Corporate board members will only change their
companies' disclosure policies once they are confident that
good faith projections will not expose their companies to legal
liability. 39 This will only come after the courts clear up am-




Company projections are acknowledged as one of the
most important types of information any investor could have
about a particular company.32' Most companies, however,
supply such assessments only to certain market profession-
als, leaving individual investors who do not utilize profes-
sional research uninformed.322 Companies may eventually
adopt open disclosure policies, but this is not guaranteed.23
In the best case scenario, most companies will not release in
depth earnings estimates publicly for at least a few years.24
The SEC, whose mandate it is to ensure that investors re-
ceive "information material to informed investment and cor-
porate suffrage decision making,"3 25 cannot sit idly by, letting
some analysts and their clients gain at the expense of indi-
vidual investors, in the hope that company disclosure will
eventually become fair. The SEC should intercede on behalf
of the public's interest and require fair disclosure, especially
in light of the PSLRA's goal of increasing dissemination of
316. See PSLRA, supra note 172, at 86,758.
317. See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
318. See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
319. See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
320. See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
321. See supra note 226.
322. See supra notes 209-210.
323. See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
324. See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
325. See supra note 99.
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earnings estimates to the public.326
This comment proposes that the SEC can bring about
fair disclosure most easily by adopting a rule, modeled after
its 1973 release,2 declaring that company disclosure of
earnings guidance is a material event. Earnings guidance, if
released at all, would then have to be made available "on a
equitable basis to all investors."2 '
Such a policy will not work undue hardship on compa-
nies. Those who do not wish to release projections and,
therefore, not reap the rewards of open disclosure policy (less
uncertainty regarding the company's stock and a higher stock
price)329 would not be required to do so. Those who do wish to
release earnings projections to the market need only dis-
seminate such estimates through a press release or a posting
on their web page." Under this approach, both professional
and individual investors will be informed. Nothing else in
the current corporate disclosure machine needs to be altered.
Analysts can continue to question management in investment
conferences, one-on-one discussions, and conference calls as
vigorously as ever. Corporations would only have the obliga-
tion not to reveal to a select few earnings guidance or other
information that would allow a reasonable person to ascer-
326. See discussion supra Part II.D.1.
327. See supra Part II.B.2.
328. See supra Part II.B.2. Violations of this rule would admittedly be diffi-
cult to prove in most cases. The rule, however, would not be important because
it could hold insiders accountable for unfair dissemination, but because it would
put insiders on notice that it is not proper to release earnings guidance to only
the professional investment community. All the major stock exchanges cur-
rently encourage listed corporations "to seek out formal and informal contact
with analysts to facilitate the accurate pricing of their securities." SEC Release
33-7101, supra note 14, at 2009 (citing New York Stock Exchange Manual, §
202.02; American Stock Exchange Guide § 402 and National Association of Se-
curities Dealers Investor Relations Guide, Cultivating the Investing Commu-
nity, at 18). It is thus easy to see how today's Chief Financial Officer might be-
lieve there is nothing wrong with unequal dissemination in regards to earnings
guidance. Once company officers in charge of investor relations receive a clear
message on the topic of earnings guidance there is no reason to believe that the
majority would not comply.
329. See PSLRA, supra note 172, at 86,758.
330. Although a strong case can be made for regulating differential disclo-
sure, defined broadly as any disclosure given to only analysts, a more prudent
approach is to focus initially on differential disclosure in its narrowest sense;
earnings guidance given only to analysts. Companies would likely not find
regulation on the latter nearly as difficult as regulation on the former. Regula-
tion of differential disclosure in its broadest sense could always be initiated af-
ter success with intervention in the area of earnings projections.
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tain the company's internal earnings estimate. Intel, argua-
bly one of the most successful technology companies of all
time, and PeopleSoft, a fast growing high tech company, are
proof that such a disclosure model can be implemented with
311great success.
VI. CONCLUSION
Management's assessment of its future earnings pros-
pects is of great worth to professional and individual inves-
tors alike. Yet under the present disclosure system only the
professional investment community is privy to such informa-
tion. Although corporations may eventually adopt a more
open disclosure method after the provisions of PSLRA and
the SLUSA are firmly established, this is not guaranteed. As
a result, the SEC should intervene and adopt a bright line
rule declaring the disclosure of earnings guidance a material
event. Through such a rule, individual investors will enjoy
what professional investors have enjoyed for a long time, ac-
cess to the ball park.
Peter L. Cholakis
331. See discussion supra Part II.D.2. A more open disclosure model may
even decrease a firm's liability risk in some cases. See supra note 216.
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